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Closing the Liability Loophole: The Liability Convention
and the Future of Conflict in Space
Trevor Kehrer ∗

Abstract
The 21st century has borne witness to an explosion of human activity of all kinds in space;
but the rules that govern that activity have failed to keep pace. The extant international liability
regime for damage on Earth caused by space objects has a blind spot that the original framers
could not have anticipated: an object launched into space by one nation may now come under the
control of another nation—or even a private actor—through cyberwarfare. Moreover, the liability
regime has another problem: if an incident involving an object in space results in harm on Earth,
the Liability Convention does not demand an inquiry into—or consider—the underlying cause
of the incident. If such an event were to come to pass, under the current regime of international
law regarding space, the state that launched the space object would assume an obligation to pay
for any harm on Earth caused by that object. The consequence of this order is a paradox; one in
which a state’s responsibility to pay for damage is not linked to proximate causation or its own
actions, but instead to mere ownership or assistance in launching the object. Thus, wholly innocent
launching states will currently foot the bill for any damage caused by unknown culprits or third
parties. This is in contravention of basic principles of state responsibility and is at odds with the
result anticipated by the analogous customary law of the sea. As space becomes more crowded
with potentially vulnerable space objects and future conflict in space becomes more likely, this
misattribution of responsibility must be corrected in order to ensure that the Liability
Convention’s stated goal of creating “effective international rules and procedures concerning
liability” actually strengthens international cooperation instead of undermining it.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
As commercialization and militarization of space proceed at an exponential
rate, more actors than ever before are reaching for the stars. Indeed, astronauts
and the satellites they live on and service are becoming increasingly critical to a
globalized economy. 1 Distressingly, however, the current liability regime creates a
loophole of just the right size to permit a bad actor to bring a space object back
down to Earth and cause harm, yet never worry about facing liability for that harm.
This is because current international law commands that a state assume
responsibility for harm caused by a satellite it launched regardless of whether there
was an intervening actor. Opportunities for mischief abound as a result, and this
paper will explore hypotheticals that sketch out the shape that future conflict in
space may consequently take.
The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”) laid the groundwork for a system of
“international liab[ility] for damage” caused by objects in space, but did not create
a comprehensive regime. 2 That task was instead left to the 1972 Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability
Convention”). By the terms of the Liability Convention, when harm on Earth is
caused by an object in space or formerly in space, the state that launched the object
is presumed to be liable—even if it had no hand in bringing the harm about. This
conclusion is compelled by the Liability Convention’s apparent silence on the
matter of intervening acts by third parties and its plain text. 3 The Liability
Convention’s blindness to the possibility of intervening acts and its consequent
misattribution of responsibility is nonsensical in the current context of human
endeavors in space. Moreover, such a result is inconsistent with well-established
background principles of international law regarding state responsibility and with
1

The global positioning satellite network system (GNSS or GPS) is one particularly well-known
example. GPS is responsible for trillions of dollars in economic benefits in the U.S. alone, see NAM
D. PHAM, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM AND ITS
COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS 12, Table 5 (2013), and is available to any
person with access to the internet. The European GNSS Agency estimates that there will be nearly
as many GPS receivers as there are humans on Earth by 2022. EUROPEAN GNSS AGENCY, GNSS
MARKET REPORT 5 (2013), http://perma.cc/36ZW-TYUB.

2

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. VII, January 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S 8843 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, art. II, Mar. 29, 1972,
24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 13810 [hereinafter Liability Convention].

3
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international law analogues. These considerations weigh in favor of re-examining
the Liability Convention’s terms.
Like much international law, the purpose of the law of space is to permit
orderly settlement of disputes between nations and to deter or equitably redress
harm. The Liability Convention accomplishes the former objective by imposing a
simple regime of strict liability—there is no dispute about who is legally
responsible for harm under the regime. The Liability Convention fails to
accomplish the latter goal, however, because its operation in cases involving
intervening third parties is so inconsistent with basic principles of state
responsibility that the preordained loser of a dispute would have no reason to
consent to pay compensation. Moreover, the Liability Convention’s terms
ironically cannot possibly hold the most proximate cause of harm in these
situations—the archetypical “Holmesian bad man”—liable for it. 4 The Liability
Convention thereby fails to deter bad actors and instead incentivizes frontier
justice, inviting more disorderly conflict rather than avoiding and settling disputes.
Given that astronauts are effectively the sailors of space (and satellites are
akin to their ships), an analogy to the law of the sea may help demonstrate the
shortcomings of current space law. The customary law of war at sea provides that
whichever state takes control of a ship via capture also assumes ownership and
responsibility for it. 5 Moreover, under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, individuals who seize ships for private ends are pirates subject to any penalties
an apprehending state sees fit, and their stolen ships are understood to be pirate
ships while under pirate control. 6 Importantly, no positive international liability
regime is necessary to address the acts of pirates (on Earth or otherwise). 7 Thus,
the customary law of the sea comprehends that responsibility for harm flows not
from ownership, but from effective control. No such provision exists in the law
of space. Therefore, states that launch satellites are held responsible for the harm
4

In other words, an actor or state may rationally calculate how much harm it can cause to its
adversaries before the law attributes blame and punishment to it. As this Comment will illustrate,
the current liability regime permits the Holmesian bad man to cause considerable harm without fear
of legal liability. This, in turn, should encourage the reader to critically examine the incentives the
regime creates through its own terms. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457 (1897).

5

The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations Between Belligerents: Oxford Manual on Naval
Warfare (Aug. 9, 1913), art. 102 [hereinafter Oxford Manual]; see also THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF THE SEA 313 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101–05, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
Anyone who engages in piracy or who incites or intentionally facilitates piracy is a pirate and is
subject to any penalty an apprehending state sees fit. Id. at art. 101. If this understanding of piracy
is exported to space, then anyone who commandeers a satellite for private purposes is similarly
hostis humani generis—an enemy of mankind. Thus, this Comment is primarily concerned with the
acts of states, though complications arising from identifying the bad actor will also be considered.

6

7
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caused by those satellites, even though they would not be held responsible if the
harm was caused by a hijacked boat in the analogous context of sea piracy.
The Liability Convention’s inconsistency with analogous international law
and its allowance for guilty third parties to escape legal liability, considered
together, is what this Comment terms the “liability loophole.” As this Comment
will demonstrate, even though the current regime provides a convenient rule for
apportioning liability by imposing strict liability on launching states, the liability
loophole reduces the Liability Convention’s coherency and effectiveness.
Consequently, the Liability Convention deserves review and amendment.
This Comment addresses the problem of misattribution of responsibility and
proposes several methods of closing the liability loophole. Section II of this
Comment provides a brief account of the history of the law of space, offers a
hypothetical to orient the reader, and explores the only incident in which the
Liability Convention’s terms were invoked. Next, Section III examines changes in
circumstances that cast the operation of the Liability Convention in doubt. Section
III then argues that in order to remain consistent with its goals, the Liability
Convention should adapt to those changed circumstances. Section III also reveals
that the present operation of the Liability Convention creates the liability loophole
and invites abuse. After that, Section IV illustrates how the Liability Convention
works in practice by examining a detailed hypothetical scenario that demonstrates
the Liability Convention’s shortcomings. Section V offers recommendations
concerning ways to close the loophole and make the liability regime comport with
settled principles of international law. Additionally, Section V anticipates and
addresses several critiques of solutions offered by this Comment that proponents
of the Liability Convention would likely offer in its defense. Finally, Section VI
articulates this Comment’s conclusion: amendment of the Liability Convention is
necessary in order to make it consistent with other international law, return it to
workability, and deter bad actors from causing harm.

II. B ACKGROUND OF THE P RESENT L IABILITY R EGIME
The Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention have their roots in a
prior international covenant: the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation,
more commonly known as the Chicago Convention. 8 The Chicago Convention
served as a successful proof-of-concept for international agreements that attempt
to solve complex collective-action problems related to territorial sovereignty and
issues regarding state responsibility for objects used in transportation. 9 Building
8

Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.

9

Christopher Daniel Johnson, The Outer Space Treaty, OXFORD PLANETARY SCIENCE RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://perma.cc/GG8H-8Q7S.
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on that model, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson asked the U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N. to begin drafting a treaty with terms for the organized use of space. 10
The goal was to create an instrument that was agreeable to other nations—
principally the Soviet Union—and thereby ensure continued peace on Earth and
in space. 11
The U.S. and the Soviet Union both proposed versions of a space treaty to
the U.N. in 1966, and later that year the two submissions were merged into a single
document. 12 The Outer Space Treaty was thereafter made available for signature
in 1967. 13 It was ratified by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in October of 1967. 14
It has since been ratified by 61 countries and acceded to by 36 others. 15 Within
the Outer Space Treaty’s provisions is the following seminal declaration:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an
object into outer space . . . and each State Party from whose territory or
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object
or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies. 16

This theory of strict liability based on an object’s ownership was later
elaborated upon and given an exception by the Liability Convention.
The Liability Convention was designed to build upon the terms of the Outer
Space Treaty and broadly defines “damage” as “loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of
persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations.” 17 Moreover, Article II of the Liability Convention declares that a
“launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused
by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft flight.” 18 Article III
explains that in the slightly different context of damage caused to a space object
or its contents by a space object of another launching State, “the latter shall be

10
11
12
13

Id.
Id.
Outer Space Treaty, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2018).
Id.

14

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.

15

Id.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. VII.

16
17
18

Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. II.
Id.
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liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.” 19 Of particular note is Article VI, which posits that:
exoneration from absolute liability shall be granted to the extent that a
launching state establishes that the damage has resulted either wholly or
partially from gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent
to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical
persons it represents. 20

It should be noted at this juncture that the clunky language of Article VI
leaves it open to interpretation. Under the terms of that Article, it may be that the
launching state is not responsible for harm caused by a satellite when there is an
act or omission done with intent to cause damage “experienced by” a claimant
state. 21 This interpretation of the language would permit claims commissions
formed under the Liability Convention to consider more equitable attributions of
responsibility in instances of intervening acts that cause harm; but this
interpretation does not flow as easily from the language of the treaty. Instead, the
language used therein seems to be in accordance with the phrase’s typical meaning:
“by or from (someone).” 22 The importance of this provision will be discussed in
more detail in Section V.
Though the Liability Convention embodies laudable goals, it is simply
unequipped to deal with the significant changes in technological capabilities and
international espionage that are embodied by the rising prevalence of
cyberwarfare. 23 Considered together with contemporary technology, the Liability
Convention’s provisions mean the following: when a satellite belonging to
Country A is manipulated by third-party Actor X and hits a satellite belonging to
Country B, and Country B’s satellite then causes damage to Country C on Earth,
Country B will probably be liable for that harm even if Country B can show that
the damage was not within Country B’s control. This is because Country B’s
satellite “caused” harm on Earth, and no exoneration is possible if Country C did
19
20

Id. at art. III.
Id. at art. VI.

21

See Definition of ‘On the Part of sb/On sb’s Part,’ CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://perma.cc/2YHRT4NX.

22

See Definition of ‘On the Part of (someone),’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://perma.cc/8QLS-6Z3B.
Cyberwarfare is a broad term that refers generally to operations with the goal of hostile exploitation
of networked infrastructure within or belonging to a state. As Michael Schmitt has explained,
“hostile cyber operations directed against cyber infrastructure located on another state’s territory,
whether government owned or not, constitute, inter alia, a violation of that state’s sovereignty
whenever they cause physical damage or injury.” Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo
Vadis?, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269, 274–75 (2014). Though there is disagreement about linedrawing, such activity is increasingly understood by international law experts as a potential legal
equivalent to the use of physical force under those circumstances. Id. at 281. The same principles
are easily exported to objects under the jurisdiction of a state in space, like networked satellites. For
a well-known example of cyberwarfare, see Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s
First Digital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), http://perma.cc/ZU39-2RDZ.

23
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not bring the harm upon itself. Moreover, Country A would likely not be liable to
Country B because the damage to Country B’s satellite was not due to the fault of
Country A. Even though Country B would be unable to collect restitution from
Country A, it is conceivable that Country A’s satellite is the “cause” of harm on
Earth. Therefore, between Country A and Country B, a great deal hinges on the
meaning of “cause” in the Liability Convention.
However, regardless of which country’s space object is understood to have
“caused” the harm on Earth, the fact of the matter is that the true proximate cause
of harm, Actor X, will not be held liable or deterred. Thus, either Country A or
Country B will be stuck with the bill for Actor X’s interference despite having
exerted no control over the situation—a result that would not follow under the
customary law of the sea. Due to this inconsistency with longstanding customary
law, and without direct responsibility for causing the harm at issue, it is unlikely
that a state party will be willing to pay for harm brought about by another actor.
Thus, the effects of the Liability Convention’s terms are now being tested
like never before for their consistency with other areas of international law. Not
only this, but achieving the Liability Convention’s goals of ensuring “the prompt
payment . . . of a full and equitable measure of compensation” and creating
“effective international rules and procedures concerning liability” may be
increasingly elusive. 24 Looking now to history, the Liability Convention’s
prospects in these respects indeed seem grim: during the single, simple incident in
which the Liability Convention’s terms were invoked, the Liability Convention
failed to create the effects its framers intended.
This incident was the Cosmos 954 fiasco of 1978. That year saw the first
time that harm caused by a satellite resulted in an international legal dispute. 25 This
episode began when a Soviet satellite inadvertently fell to Earth in uninhabited
Canadian territory. After Canada presented a claim for damages based in part on
the Liability Convention’s terms, Canada and the Soviet Union engaged in
negotiations regarding compensation for the cleanup of the radioactive satellite
debris that fell on Canadian land. 26 Arguments between the two nations were
principally based on norms of international behavior, and the terms of the Liability
Convention were invoked but largely ignored or, at best, considered only in the
background. 27 This is because the Canadian claim under the Liability Convention
stood on somewhat shaky ground: radioactive debris from the Soviet Cosmos 954
24
25

26

27

Liability Convention, Preamble, supra note 3.
Alexander F. Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of Satellite Accidents, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 78,
89 (1984).
Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: Definition and
Determination of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 255, 256 (1984).
Cohen, supra note 25.
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satellite landed in uninhabited Canadian land and Canada’s claim was the cost of
cleanup rather than property damage, so it was not clear that the terms of the
Liability Convention controlled. 28
One would expect that where nations disagree about the meaning of terms
in an international instrument, they would submit their claim to the arbitrator
prescribed by the convention to resolve such disputes. However, the Canadian
claims ultimately did not go before a claims commission established under the
Liability Convention. 29 Instead, the countries agreed on a terse diplomatic solution
after the U.S. assisted Canada in debris cleanup and the Soviet satellite remnants
were transferred to the U.S. 30 Thus, even though the Cosmos incident was about
as straightforward as a scenario involving disagreement over the Liability
Convention’s terms can be, invoking the Liability Convention served only as an
intermediary step in the negotiation of a final outcome. The Liability Convention
failed to serve its purpose of establishing an effective procedure for resolving
international disputes—it was relegated to operating solely in the background.
Though it is only one example, the Cosmos 954 incident is illustrative of
the larger trend: states party simply do not rely on the Liability Convention’s
procedures, even when they may be applicable. The Liability Convention conflicts
with the integral principle of international law that control gives rise to
responsibility. That conflict may play a part in explaining state non-reliance, but
the simple fact of the matter is that the Liability Convention has plainly not seen
successful use. Given that the instrument was designed to be the basis for dispute
resolution when satellites are involved, that ought to be troubling.

III. S ETTING S AIL FOR D ISASTER : P RACTIC AL AND
C ONCEPTUAL P ROBLEMS FOR THE L IAB ILITY
C ONVENTION
The process by which a claim should be settled under the Liability
Convention is rather simple in the abstract. First, some form of actionable harm
occurs. Then, a claim by the damaged state is presented to the responsible space
object’s launching state within one year. 31 Diplomatic negotiations are expected
to take place thereafter. 32 If negotiations fail, a claims commission is then
constituted by three arbiters who are to be chosen within two months: one by
28

In other words, property that is valuable and capable of deterioration in value. The land at issue in
the dispute was uninhabited tundra. Burke, supra note 26, at 276–77.

29

Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.

30
31
32

Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. X.
Id. at art. XIV.

186

Vol. 20 No. 1

Closing the Liability Loophole

Kehrer

each party (or collection of parties) and one chosen jointly. 33 If one state does not
participate in choosing the arbiters for four months, the other may request that
the Secretary-General of the U.N. appoint a single arbiter within two months. 34
This commission then issues its decision within one year, which shall be final and
binding if both parties (or collections of parties) consent; otherwise it is a
recommendation. 35
As this process demonstrates, the Liability Convention’s goal of determining
proper restitution for harm is dependent on good-faith cooperation and
collaboration between the states party involved. If there is concurrent armed
conflict between the relevant states party, claims are unlikely to be successfully
compensated; and if the armed conflict lasts for more than a year, the damaged
state’s claim will likely expire unless it requests that a claims commission be
established. 36 Without the launching state’s consent, this would create a onearbitrator commission in line with Article XVI of the Liability Convention. 37 In
such a scenario—that is, without the participation and consent of the launching
state—the findings and decision of the commission would serve only as a
recommendation to be considered in good faith. 38 Perhaps such a decision could
be used as leverage in peace treaty negotiations, but that point is fairly speculative.
In short, if the launching state is hostile to the victim state or if it determines that
the liability regime is unfair as applied to launching states generally, it will simply
not participate in dispute resolution. This undermines the very purpose of the
Liability Convention.

A. The Issue of Intervening Actors: Practical Problems for the
Liability Convention
The Liability Convention’s critical dependence on good-faith negotiation is
not the only mechanical difficulty the liability regime faces. The Liability
Convention has sweeping terms; but its regime of strict liability does not
adequately address the problem presented by space objects deorbiting or
otherwise causing harm on Earth due to intervening causes. Unless a state brought
harm upon itself by a grossly negligent action or omission, the state that launched
the damage-causing satellite is either singularly or jointly liable for any injury,

33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at arts. XV, XVII.
Id. at art. XV.
Id. at art. XIX.
Id. at art. XIV.
Id. at art. XVI.
Id. at art. XIX.
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depending on whether the space object was launched jointly with another state. 39
This appears to be inequitable at best and creates perverse incentives for a bad
actor to use the satellites of other nations as leverage and weapons at worst.
The Liability Convention’s stubborn adherence to a rule of strict liability
which does not take agency into account can be explained by the fact that the
framers of the existing international liability regime considered “[n]o other
exceptions to the principle of absolute liability, such as armed conflict, civil
disturbance, insurrection, or acts of a third party.” 40 Perhaps this is unsurprising:
In a period of time when only two countries were realistically capable of
maintaining major space programs, it was probably easy for the framers to assume
that the overwhelming majority of space objects would be controlled by one of
those two countries or otherwise be jointly launched by one of the two in
partnership with states within their respective spheres of influence. It could have
been efficient for the Liability Convention’s framers to simply chalk a given
instance of harm up to one state or the other according to whichever launched
the harmful object into space rather than try to prescribe or predict how agency
would be factored into the legal framework later on.
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the current strict liability
regime does not make sense in a multi-polar world where some fifty-four
countries have launched satellites of various kinds, to say nothing of the regime’s
inconsistency with customary international law regarding the analogous act of
piracy. 41 The liability regime must be amended so that it may achieve its goals,
remain an effective route for dispute resolution, and maintain consistency with
longstanding principles of state responsibility in international law—in particular,
the principle imbedded in the law of the sea and in customary international law
that state responsibility flows from effective control. 42 These considerations have
yet to be taken up by any influential legal authority, and so the terms of the
Liability Convention remain open to some interpretation in this respect. Before
changes to the regime are proposed, though, it is necessary to lay out in more
detail the recent changes that have brought the effectiveness of the Liability
Convention and the means chosen by its framers into question.

39
40

Id. at arts. V, VI.
Mohamed Abdulgader Tumi, Space Law: International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects—The
1972 Liability for Damages Convention 174 (Sept. 30, 1984) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, George
Washington University National Law Center).

41

Notifications from States & Organizations, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., https://perma.cc/ETA53MWA.

42

UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 101–05; see G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, arts. 17–18 (Jan. 28, 2002); see also id. at art. 23.
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1. The bar to entry to space has been lowered, and commercialization
of space is now nigh-universal.
The character and volume of human activities in space have changed
substantially since the advent of the Liability Regime in ways that could not have
been easily foreseen by the Liability Convention’s drafters. Since 1967, many
additional countries besides the U.S. and the Soviet Union have sent materials and
astronauts to space. The International Space Station, for instance, is made of
components constructed by six countries (plus the European Union). 43 According
to the U.N., 54 countries and two international organizations have registered
satellites in space. 44 Analysis of reports submitted to the U.N. Office for Outer
Space Affairs shows that a total of 8,126 satellites have been launched and that
twenty-two percent of these objects were launched in the last eight years. 45 The
most recent data suggests that there are 4,987 satellites currently orbiting Earth,
and that of these satellites, 1,957 are active. 46 The majority of active satellites are
commercial in nature. 47
Thus, commercial use of space is now incredibly widespread; to say nothing
of the fact that accessing space has become immensely easier since the late 20th
century. Private space companies have received overwhelming economic support
and investment. Private investors injected about 3.9 billion dollars into
commercial space companies in 2017, and today’s commercial rockets are proving
to be more reliable and more cost-effective than those designed by states, spurring
privatization and commercialization onward. 48 Indeed, the privatization of space
exploration and rocket development has progressed apace in recent years: firms
such as SpaceX are setting and achieving ambitious goals like hosting more
launches than any government agency and placing a network of internet service
satellites in orbit within a matter of years. 49 So strong is American public optimism
and faith in companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic that an
43
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overwhelming 81 percent of those surveyed believe that these companies will
make a profit. 50 Of those who are “highly attentive to space news,” over 90
percent believe that private companies will build safe and reliable spacecraft or
control costs when doing so. 51
However, the rapid commercialization of space is not purely positive. Even
with this valuable exploitation of space for human ends, the increasing volume of
satellites in space also means that there is a greater likelihood of something going
awry in space and causing harm on Earth. Perhaps much more distressing is that
the rapid development of both extensive computer networks and methods of
waging cyberwar means that as time goes on, an expanding number of satellites
will become increasingly vulnerable to abuse by sophisticated states or third
parties. This abuse and cooption by third parties via cyberwarfare is a concept
discussed below in Section 3.

2. Militarization of space has kept pace with commercialization.
The increasing trend of militarizing space is of particular concern. Although
the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 70/27 (“No First Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space”) as recently as 2015, the perennial and chief difficulty
in preventing and addressing the militarization of space is that in the modern
world, even ordinary commercial or waste-disposal satellites can be converted
rather easily into makeshift weapons by sophisticated actors. 52 In recognition of
these facts, the U.S. Air Force maintains a unit dedicated solely to space
operations, and the recent proposal for a U.S. Space Force was made in response
to the increasing activity of other states in space. 53 This Space Force will be tasked
with developing weapons and countermeasures in anticipation of warfare in the
realm of space. 54 As more complex space-based weapon systems and
countermeasures are developed, satellites used for military purposes will likely
have ever-increasing capabilities to cause harm beyond simply falling to Earth. 55
Both potential and direct militarization of space are thus becoming more likely by
the day.
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While Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty forbids weapons of mass
destruction from being placed into space, the definition of such weapons in the
treaty is notably vague, and several proposals for plausibly-compliant satellitebased weapon systems capable of extreme harm have existed for decades. 56 Even
without these ticking time bombs floating in space, however, a large number of
satellites are currently used for military purposes. As of 2018, according to the
Union of Concerned Scientists, the U.S. military uses over 170 satellites, Russia
operates 97 military satellites, and China’s military controls 100. 57
China demonstrated in 2007 that it could shoot down a satellite using a landbased anti-satellite missile; the U.S. performed the same feat in 2008. 58 As a
practical matter, these weapon systems may help mitigate damage from falling
satellites and may also serve as a form of self-defense. However, these missiles
have not seen use outside of very well-controlled experiments, and their efficacy
in live-fire situations is therefore unknown. Thus, one should not confuse
advances in the destructive potential of military technology in space with an equal
pace of development with regards to countermeasures.
Space may well be the site of the next arms race, akin to the nuclear arms
race of the Cold War. 59 And similar to the deterrent and de-escalation effect of
Cold War treaties on the U.S. and Soviet Union, even those nations that might
have the potential to protect themselves in the future may end up needing to rely
on provisions of international law if things go wrong. In that event, the Liability
Convention must be workable and sensible. In short, new technologies do not
abrogate the necessity of a legal instrument that establishes order and deters
aggression in what would otherwise be a chaotic affair.

3. Cyberwarfare capabilities are expanding and are being increasingly
oriented towards space.
Even putting aside the overtly increasing militarization of space, the growing
commercialization of space and volume of human space activities are of particular
importance when considering the threat posed by cyberwarfare—a concept the
early drafters of the international law of space likely regarded as akin to sciencefiction. Traditional military technologies like missiles and satellites are not the only
beneficiaries of recent developments; cyberwarfare is also becoming far more
advanced. It is now possible for purely commercial satellites to be turned into
56
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weapons or be used in support of an armed attack on Earth—even if that was not
part of their original design—by a sophisticated actor or state. 60 The rapid
commercialization of space also means that there are now several more tools for
bad actors to take advantage of.
To further demonstrate the danger that even necessary and innocuous
satellites may pose if they are abused, consider that satellites designed for space
junk cleanup or servicing of other satellites can also be “readily commanded to
grapple and destroy an adversary’s satellite.” 61 Currently, the primary proposed
method of space junk cleanup is to use a satellite to drag other, smaller satellites
or assorted objects into the Earth’s atmosphere, causing a gradual and complete
burn-up of the junk. 62 Cleanup satellites such as these may eventually be designed
to be capable of creating sufficient thrust to de-orbit even a larger satellite by
grappling it and decelerating. Given this, “accidents” could be strategically
manufactured by bad actors through subtle or sudden manipulation of cleanup
satellites—even those not belonging to them. Under the Liability Convention’s
terms, akin to the hypothetical orientation scenario offered in Section II, the
owner of the de-orbited satellite would likely be on the hook for any harm caused
on Earth. The real bad actor would face no legal responsibility for the harm they
caused.
Perhaps just as concerning, there is a real possibility that a similar bad actor
could gain access to and take control of the functions of a military satellite—
especially one that happens to be armed—via hacking and use its capabilities to
cause harm to its owner or another state on Earth. This sort of “false flag”
operation has been the subject of military fiction in other contexts for decades. 63
This is to say nothing of the prospect of taking direct control of and de-orbiting
a large satellite onto a target country via methods of cyberwarfare, as has been
demonstrated to be possible—albeit unlikely to be successful at present. 64
The motivations behind identified incidents of satellites being compromised
via methods of cyberwarfare are largely unknown, and data about them is far from
comprehensive. Even so, sophisticated hackers that target military assets are
widely suspected to be working on behalf of state governments (as modern
equivalents to privateers). 65 It is also conceivable that in any given instance the
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cyber-attackers are instead operating as lone wolves (effectively, as pirates) and
hope to damage the assets of a state for reasons unrelated to state interests or to
hold those assets for ransom. In fact, one hacker group claimed it had attempted
to do just this to the U.K. in 1999. 66
The very real danger posed by advances in cyberwarfare is illustrated by the
following recent incident: in June 2018, Chinese computers—though not
definitively the Chinese government—were involved in an operation that took
over some functions of “computers that controlled [U.S. military and commercial]
satellites, so that they could have changed the positions of the orbiting devices
and disrupted data traffic.” 67 It should be noted that, as incidents like this are a
fairly new phenomenon, only limited data on the number of hacking incidents has
been collected so far. 68 However, Wired characterized recent instances of satellite
hacking by Chinese computers as a “clandestine but incessant hacking
campaign[]” that continues “between the [U.S.] and China.” 69 Indeed, both China
and the U.S. have been “very heavily focused on” securing and stealing
information regarding “military trade secrets, military preparedness, military
readiness, [and] satellite communications.” 70 In the incident described above, the
hackers “spent the most time . . . on the satellites” observing systems involving
“command and control” and “the operational side for both . . . geospatial imagery
and . . . telecom[munications].” 71 In brief, the hacker infiltrated the control
systems of the satellite and was able to observe all of the satellite’s activities
unimpeded.
It is deeply concerning that the change in focus towards conducting
cyberwarfare in space is present on both sides of the Pacific: the mission of the
30,000 members of the U.S. Air Force Space Command was previously to oversee
cyber and information warfare, but has recently changed to “provid[ing] resilient
and affordable space capabilities for the Air Force.” 72 These developments
indicate that powerful states are preparing to make space the next theater of war.
Indeed, the utility of waging cyberwar instead of physical shows of force has
become common knowledge in national security circles. As one security expert
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put it: “Hacking can be used as a sign of force in a lot of cases to say ‘hey, we’re
not happy and we’re going to make you feel some pain’ . . . . [States] use that as a
first step instead of having to send fighter jets.” 73 Thus, cyberwarfare is becoming
an increasingly common substitute for and possible precursor to the use of force,
rather than simply a complex form of spying—and those methods are now being
used in space rather than solely on Earth.
While all of this may seem akin to science fiction or fearmongering to the
casual reader, both citizens and lawmakers should be concerned about the extent
to which the existing legal regime fails to account for the fact that satellites may
now be used to cause harm on Earth in new ways. As Vikram Thakur, the
technical director of the top-tier cybersecurity firm Symantec, explained recently
in an interview: “Disruption to satellites could leave civilian as well as military
installations subject to huge disruptions . . . . We are extremely dependent on their
functionality.” 74 The grave threat of cyberwarfare being waged in space necessarily
raises questions about how responsibility can and should be apportioned when
those acts of cyberwarfare result in harm.
It is now clear that the world’s satellite infrastructure is currently vulnerable
to sophisticated parties well-versed in methods of cyberwarfare, whatever their
motivations might be. Thus, the threat that a launching state’s satellite might be
appropriated in order to be dropped on another state or on the launching state
itself by a third party is no longer relegated to the realm of fiction. In anticipation
of such an event, the international liability regime should not be structured so as
to allow that bad actor to walk away scot-free. At the very least, the international
liability regime should not have the guaranteed outcome of forcing a completely
innocent state to foot the bill for the bad acts of another, as it currently does.

B. A Matter of Principle: Conceptual Problems for the Liability
Convention
The rising number of space objects in the modern era coupled with the
increasing ability of states and even private actors to take control of normallyinnocuous satellites means that the incentives created by the existing strict liability
regime urgently need to be reexamined. A liability regime that punishes an
innocent launching state for an intervening third party’s use of a satellite to cause
harm is incompatible with recognized basic principles of state responsibility that
recognize that control, not ownership, is the core element of responsibility. 75 Not
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only this, but such attribution of responsibility is similarly incompatible with the
analogous customary law of the sea, which also connects responsibility with
control instead of ownership. 76 The Liability Convention thus fails to maintain
consistency with other bodies of international customary law and is unable to
actualize its motivating principles in situations involving intervening acts by third
parties.
Furthermore, the Liability Convention’s focus on strict liability is not only
inconsistent with the general understanding of state responsibility in international
law, but also creates an unworkable standard that is highly unlikely to be enforced
or relied upon. At present, instead of properly attributing responsibility for
harmful acts, the Liability Convention’s terms seem to incentivize the Holmesian
bad man’s use of another state’s satellites to cause harm to his own rivals precisely
because he will not be made to pay for it. Instead of holding the bad actor
accountable, the regime’s rules force an innocent launching state to pay restitution
to any other state that was harmed by a third party’s use of the launching state’s
satellites as destructive tools. Such absurd ownership-based punishment makes
little sense if the Liability Convention’s purpose is to create “effective international
rules and procedures concerning liability” that strengthen “international cooperation.” 77 Presently, it would be unreasonable for launching states, which face
a near-guarantee of liability in these situations, to cooperate and pay restitution
without some sort of security for when they are not at fault. Because of this, the
result of the regime may well be more international tension and armed conflict
instead of dispute resolution.
It should also be noted that the Liability Convention’s terms have no textual
exception for acts of war, meaning that even incidents during wartime still fall
under its provisions. 78 However, the Liability Convention is unlikely to prevent
acts of war. It is overwhelmingly improbable that a perpetrator of a premeditated
act of war will be willing to compensate a victim state while a war between them
is ongoing. Additionally, the longstanding custom in armed conflict is that each
state determines how restitution will be paid to its own citizens harmed by acts of
war. 79 Thus, if a state makes an attack using a space object and such attack
constitutes an act of war, the problem of uncompensated harm will still exist in
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the absence of a later treaty between the warring states. A decision by a claims
commission called to address a claim under the Liability Convention may play a
part in peace negotiations, but it would be unrealistic to assume that it would carry
force in the midst of war. Thus, the Liability Convention will not in all cases
“ensure . . . the prompt payment . . . of a full and equitable measure of
compensation to victims” of damage caused by space objects. 80
Unfortunately, despite its sweeping terms, the current liability regime
probably has its strongest likelihood of being adhered to in the case of an accident
involving states party that already engage in regular diplomacy with each other—
a case where it is probably least necessary precisely because of that ongoing
relationship. However, as the Cosmos 954 incident discussed above illustrates,
even states party that have an established diplomatic channel have been highly
averse to relying on the terms of the Liability Convention. Although the Liability
Convention has the laudable aims of compensating all harm, creating
predictability, and establishing orderly resolution of disputes, it presently falls
short in achieving its stated goals. The Liability Convention’s terms create
predictability at the expense of preventing orderly resolution of disputes, and
thereby fail to ensure compensation for harm. Forcing an innocent state to pay
for the harm caused by actions of another beyond its control cannot possibly be
reconciled with background principles of international law, and doing so therefore
threatens the effectiveness of the whole regime. Unfortunately, because the
current regime does just that, it invites chaos and disaster.
In light of these considerations, the liability regime created by the Liability
Convention should be retooled in order to operate more realistically and fairly. As
the above discussion of acts of war shows, it will not be possible to compensate
harm caused by satellites in all instances. Moreover, perfect predictability of results
is useless if the winner and loser are always preordained but cooperation and
consent from both is required. Without the victim’s sanction, the claims
commission can do nothing of substance. Instead, the liability regime should
ensure that when a nation is at fault for harm caused outside of war, it pays for
that harm. The liability regime should similarly ensure that innocent parties—
victims of harm and those whose satellites were hijacked alike—bear as little
burden as possible. If the launching state has the possibility to receive
compensation in turn from the guilty party, it may be more willing to submit to
the jurisdiction of the claims commission. At the very least, in no case should the
liability regime operate to shield bad actors from liability for the harm they cause.
The liability loophole must be closed in order to ensure that justice is served.
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IV. U NDERSTANDING THE L IABILITY L OOPHOLE IN P RACTICE
The liability regime begins to fall apart—even under its own terms—in the
case of harm on Earth which is deliberately caused by an unknown party. As
demonstrated above, the cause of the harm is an irrelevant consideration for the
Liability Convention. The only relevant inquiry is the ownership of the satellite
that caused harm on Earth. There is also an additional complication: the Liability
Convention’s terms do not neatly prescribe how damage caused on Earth by
particularly complex satellites should be handled. Although the existing regime
operates fairly smoothly under its own terms for satellites constructed and
launched by a single nation, in cases involving complicated satellites made of parts
from multiple contributors, each participating state’s liability for harm will be very
difficult to determine.

A. A Fully-Armed and Operational Space Station: Stress-testing
the Liability Convention’s Mechanics
Perhaps this particular problem would be best demonstrated by a
hypothetical scenario. Earth’s heaviest and most complex artificial satellite is the
420-ton International Space Station. 81 As human activity in space becomes more
commonplace, it is reasonable to assume that this prominent satellite will serve as
a model for future cooperative ventures in space. The downside of this satellite,
however, is that NASA estimates that between 53,500 and 173,250 pounds of the
International Space Station’s material would survive even a controlled re-entry
into Earth’s atmosphere. 82 Thus, while it has served as a symbol of international
cooperation in space, the International Space Station also has immense potential
to cause harm on Earth. For these reasons—and because of the unique legal
challenges it presents—the International Space Station will be the subject of the
following hypothetical scenario.
Suppose now that the International Space Station was deliberately caused to
fall from orbit and its remains descended onto an American metropolitan
population center, causing immense property damage and loss of life. There is
great uncertainty regarding the proper apportionment of liability in the wake of
the satellite’s de-orbit. Neither the International Space Station’s own legal
framework nor the Liability Convention adequately addresses this concern. Both
will be examined in turn.
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1. The International Space Station’s legal framework cannot repel a
problem of this magnitude.
The International Space Station’s legal framework posits that each state
retains ownership of (and thus responsibility for) each part of the space station
that it supplies. 83 However, this is in direct conflict with the terms of the Liability
Convention, which pronounces that responsibility for harm caused on Earth by a
space object is based on the object’s launching state or is otherwise joint and
several between the states involved in launching that space object. 84 How the
International Space Station is defined thus assumes central importance. It is
important to note that the International Space Station legal framework recognizes
the Liability Convention in its preamble and in Article 17. 85 In that Article, it
explains that “except as otherwise provided in Article 16,” the Liability
Convention determines liability for any harm. 86 Article 16 consists of a “CrossWaiver of Liability.” 87 This waiver explains that claims stemming from any damage
caused by “Protected Space Operations” (meaning all launch vehicle activities,
space station activities, and payload activities on Earth, in space, or in transit
between Earth and space) will be waived by the participating agencies. 88 Article
16(3)(c) expands this waiver between the contributing states to also cover liability
under the Liability Convention. 89 Thus, a deliberate de-orbit by a malicious actor
is clearly not contemplated nor covered by the terms of the cross-waiver—only
normal space activities by the contracting states are. 90
Moreover, Article 17 explains that all partner states will otherwise “remain
liable in accordance with the Liability Convention,” so the International Space
Station legal framework extends only to relationships between the contracting
states and effectively evades the issue of apportioning liability for harm on Earth
caused by an actor other than one of the contracting states. Even though its
explanation of property ownership might have been a helpful tool for
apportioning liability, because the ownership principle advanced by the
International Space Station legal framework conflicts with the Liability
Convention and because it also asserts that states party remain liable in accordance
83
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with the Liability Convention’s terms, the International Space Station legal
framework does little to resolve the problems presented in this hypothetical.

2. The Liability Convention does not have it where it counts.
The Liability Convention does not seem to anticipate the creation of a
complex satellite like the International Space Station. Article V of the Liability
Convention speaks of “two or more States jointly launch[ing] a space object” and
explains that a “[s]tate from whose territory or facility a space object is launched
shall be regarded as a participant in a joint launching.” 91 However, the Liability
Convention appears to reference singular launching events in these clauses, not a
program of launches like that which resulted in the construction of the
International Space Station. The Liability Convention does not contemplate the
possibility that several objects launched into space over a period of time by
multiple nations may be joined together into a single functional whole.
Additionally, the Liability Convention’s focus on space objects does not
draw a helpful definitional line in the context of complex satellites. The
International Space Station is a collection of several modules which were
themselves space objects before being put together. A “space object” is defined
to include “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and
parts thereof,” but there appears to be no consideration of the possibility that
individual satellites might be intended as parts of a larger whole. 92 Thus, it is
difficult to explain what exactly the International Space Station is for the purpose
of attributing liability according to the Liability Convention.
To elaborate, if the International Space Station is made up of “component
parts” that are themselves space objects, it remains unclear if all those space
objects are in turn amalgamated into the International Space Station once they are
physically connected or if they remain separate for the purposes of liability. 93 If
the International Space Station is assumed to be a single space object for the
purposes of the Liability Convention, there is still the question of which nation is
the responsible launching state. Of course, because multiple nations collaborated
on putting the satellite together over time, it would be considerably unfair to
arbitrarily assign a single nation as designated responsible launching state. Thus,
the single launching state category probably does not adequately cover the
International Space Station.
Alternatively, it might be asked whether “two or more states jointly
launch[ed]” the International Space Station, creating joint and several liability
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between them for any harm caused by it on Earth. 94 Determining the answer to
this question, however, is complicated by the fact that the various parts of the
International Space Station were not all made by the same states, launched at the
same time, or launched from the same place. This would seem to place the
International Space Station outside of the definition provided by Article V, which
is tied to launching events, not the resulting completed complex satellite. 95
The International Space Station may also be understood as a collection of
individual satellites; as such, joint and several liability would not apply to it as a
whole and each individual launching state would remain responsible for each
satellite it places in space. This is all well and good, but a practical question
immediately comes to the fore: if each of the satellites is amalgamated into the
whole, what is the proper regime to use in order to determine the amount of
restitution owed to a harmed state by that whole? In the scenario considered by
this Section, the amount of harm caused by each individual satellite is likely to be
almost impossible to determine.

3. The return of market share liability?
The reader might suppose at this juncture that there must be a satisfactory
way to apportion liability in the scenario under consideration. The reader might,
for example, recall the famous U.S. tort case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories—but
the approach that Sindell established is not without significant problems. 96 Even
though the reader might have a gut instinct to apply the Sindell method to these
circumstances, doing so would more deeply entrench the liability loophole.
The plaintiff in Sindell claimed that she was harmed by a drug with dangerous
side effects. Even though there was uncertainty about which drug manufacturer
was individually responsible for her injury, the drug at issue, DES, was uniform
across drug manufacturers. 97 Moreover, it was certain that the plaintiff had been
harmed by such drug product. 98 The court therefore proposed a novel method of
apportioning liability: it ordered each manufacturer of the drug product to pay a
share of the plaintiff’s damages equal to the amount of their market share in the
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drug at the time the plaintiff purchased the harmful product. 99 This “market share
liability” solution (adapted to the “market” of the mass of the International Space
Station), if found to be just and equitable by a claims commission, would fit the
terms of the Liability Convention. 100
The Sindell case garnered much controversy, however, because it did away
with needing to prove “fault and causation as elements” in the case before
ascribing liability. 101 This lack of due regard for fault and causation is precisely the
problem that this Comment perceives in the Liability Convention, so adopting the
Sindell court’s market share liability would do more harm than good: on the one
hand, a reasonable method for attributing liability in complex cases will be
established; on the other, fault and causation will continue to be disregarded and
the Holmesian bad man will still have no need to worry about legal responsibility.
Even though Sindell’s market share liability method of apportioning liability
has a small but devoted following in academic literature and is sometimes seen as
a potential solution for complex international problems like climate change,
Sindell’s rule has wisely not been accepted in other countries nor in positive
international law. 102 This lack of lasting influence makes it doubtful that market
share liability will be adopted by an international claims commission called under
the Liability Convention.
In sum, refusing to imitate Sindell would leave the particular attribution
problem posed by the International Space Station unaddressed, but would more
importantly uphold the normal requirements of showing the defendant’s fault and
causation as necessary elements before imposing liability. Although some
commentators favor adopting a market share liability regime in these
circumstances, the market share apportionment scheme is a red herring and
merely a band-aid over a deep wound. Market share liability does nothing to close
the liability loophole, and may in fact more deeply entrench it. Market share
liability should therefore be rejected as a solution and be considered no further.

99

Id. at 611–12.
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This is because Article XII of the Liability Convention instructs that compensation “shall be
determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity” to the
extent which “will restore the person [or collective] . . . on whose behalf the claim is presented to
the condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.” Liability Convention,
supra note 3, at art. XII.
Lewis A. Berns & George J. Lykos, Sindell v. Abbott Labs—“The Heir of the Citadel,” 15 THE FORUM
1031, 1038 (Summer 1980).
See THE PRACTICE OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1047 n.190 (Andre
Nollkaemper et al. eds., 2017); see also RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 293 n.288 (2005).
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4. Article VII of the Liability Convention is a phantom menace.
There is an additional complication in the Liability Convention to be
considered: the Liability Convention’s terms do not apply to damage caused by a
launching state’s satellite to the launching state itself. Article VII of the Liability
Convention commands that the Liability Convention’s terms “shall not apply to
damage caused by a space object of a launching State to . . . nationals of that
launching State.” 103 In other words, the Liability Convention is not activated by
an American satellite causing harm to Americans so long as the U.S. is responsible
for that satellite under the terms of the Liability Convention. This is true even if
the satellite fell due to an intervening act by another state or agent.
This last factor is particularly significant to the hypothetical situation under
consideration because the U.S. contributed the lion’s share of the International
Space Station’s components. 104 If the International Space Station is a single
satellite belonging to the U.S. by merit of its plurality control, and the satellite falls
onto the U.S., the damage would be entirely outside of the reach of the liability
regime and the U.S. would go without compensation for any harm suffered. To
clarify, considerable damage would likely come from component parts of the
International Space Station created and launched by other nations; but the U.S.
would not be able to collect compensation from those other nations under the
liability regime because it would be the designated responsible launching state
under this categorization of the International Space Station. 105 In a similar vein, if
the International Space Station is considered to be a collection of individual
satellites (a plurality of which are American), a calculation of how much restitution
the U.S. would be entitled to in this situation would be immensely difficult.

5. Do, or do not; there is no try.
Complex scenarios like these are where the Liability Convention’s terms are
most strenuously tested for coherency with their justifying principles and where
those terms make least sense. The problems in the regime examined above are not
relegated solely to the U.S. or the International Space Station; a similar issue would
be presented to any state whose satellite is hijacked or otherwise caused to fall on
that state itself. This is to say nothing of the dramatically unjust outcome that the
Liability Convention commands by forcing an innocent state to pay when its
satellite is used to cause harm to a second state by a third party. As these
hypothetical circumstances suggest, the Liability Convention’s terms can fail to
deter a bad actor and can actually subvert the Liability Convention’s own stated
103
104

105

Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. VII.
International Space Station Components, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM,
https://perma.cc/4SFT-FV6X.
Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. VII.
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purpose to ensure “prompt payment . . . of a full and equitable measure of
compensation to victims of . . . damage” caused by space objects. 106 Consequently,
changes to the Liability Convention are necessary in order to allay these concerns
and make the Liability Convention effective.

V. P ROPOSED S OLUTIONS FOR C LOSING THE L OOPHOLE
Section IV of this Comment demonstrated that the Liability Convention’s
terms are not always consistent with its goals. Moreover, under the Liability
Convention, legal liability does not flow from agency or control, but instead from
ownership. This is in contravention of background principles of state
responsibility for acts beyond a state’s control, 107 and could very well provoke new
tensions rather than strengthen cooperation or ensure that restitution is paid. It
would be eminently more consistent and just to ascribe ultimate liability to
whomever is responsible for causing the harm, rather than simply assigning
responsibility to the satellite’s launching state for convenience’s sake. Indeed,
states party have seemed loath to make use of the current liability regime, and the
combination of these problems and developments in the way humans use space
that were unanticipated by the Liability Convention’s drafters may well explain
why. In order to ensure that the Liability Convention’s goals are achieved in
practice, it is necessary to change its mechanics.
This Section explores several potential solutions. First, construing the
Liability Convention’s terms to comport with background principles of
international law and the analogous customary law of the sea would initially seem
attractive. Yet, this requires deliberate blindness towards the totality of the
Liability Convention’s text and will leave the harm unaddressed. Second, making
use of the awkward language of the Liability Convention’s Article VI to excuse all
launching states from harm they did not intend to cause respects state agency, but
requires interpretive contortions and again leaves harm uncompensated. Finally,
amending the Liability Convention to provide a mechanism that demands
contribution from an identified responsible third party would be the best
compromise between all of the Liability Convention’s goals. However, amending
the Liability Convention will be difficult because doing so requires a majority vote
of the states party. 108 Launching states make up only a small minority of the total
number of states party, and there is little incentive for non-launching states to
accede to a proposed compromise that principally benefits launching states.
Moreover, there is no foolproof way to guarantee contribution from a responsible
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Id. at Preamble.
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See supra text accompanying notes 5–6.
Liability Convention, supra note 3, at art. XXV.
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state. Thus, although this Comment’s last proposed solution is probably the best
one of those considered, its adoption faces considerable obstacles.

A. Interpret the Liability Convention to Conform
Background Principles of State Responsibility

to

Article XII of the Liability Convention instructs that compensation “shall be
determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and
equity.” 109 As a result of Article XII’s command, there is an internal conflict in the
Liability Convention: the textual provisions ascribing liability would create results
that are almost certainly inequitable. In this context, justice and equity would
require at least that innocent parties not bear responsibility for acts which are not
their own or within their control. 110 If explicitly-accepted international custom or
the analogous customary law of the sea applied here, a victim state would not be
held responsible for the harm stemming from the theft of the victim state’s own
ship. 111 Thus, a claims commission formed under the Liability Convention could
reasonably choose not to impose a duty to pay compensation upon a state which
more likely than not did not cause the harm motivating the claim.
One benefit of this solution is that the current regime remains textually
unaltered—no amendment to the Liability Convention’s text is necessary in order
to effect this change. An additional benefit is that an innocent state will not
necessarily need to pay for harm that it did not cause if the claims commissioners
accept this point of view. This would bring the liability regime into accordance
with the core tenet of the customary law of the sea that responsibility flows from
effective control, not mere ownership. Moreover, this solution would give effect
to the principle accepted by the U.N. General Assembly that states are not
responsible for acts that were beyond their control. 112 As a result, the Liability
Convention’s consistency with other “international law and the principles of
justice and equity” would be maintained. 113
Implementing this solution, however, would essentially nullify the entirety
of the Liability Convention. If the chief mechanism of the Liability Convention
(holding launching states liable for the harm caused by their satellites) is rendered
ineffective, the entire regime falls apart. This proposed solution thus affords due
respect for state agency and is consistent with analogous international law, but
also has the very bitter side-effect of preventing quick compensation to victims of
harm. Additionally, this solution can also only be employed on a case-by-case
109

Id. at art. XII.

110

G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 42, at art. 23; see also supra text accompanying notes 5, 6, and 7.
UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 101–05.
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basis, without any guarantee of consistency in application. This will inevitably
prompt concerns over the arbitrariness of particular claims commissions,
threatening respect for the regime and its effectiveness. Moreover, this solution
effectively predetermines the launching state as the winner, which would deter
victim states from bringing claims in the first place, further nullifying the regime.

B. Interpret the Liability Convention to Excuse Launching
States from Responsibility When Another State Intended
to Cause Harm
Under Article XVIII of the Liability Convention, a claims commission is
empowered to “decide the merits of the claim for compensation and determine
the amount of compensation payable, if any.” 114 As a part of its consideration of
merits, the claims commission must interpret the arguments presented by states
party against the backdrop of the Liability Convention’s terms. As noted in
Section II of this Comment, Article VI of the Liability Convention contains
awkward language describing the conditions needed to trigger exoneration from
strict liability. 115 Of critical importance is the following language of that Article:
“exoneration . . . shall be granted to the extent that . . . the damage has resulted . . .
from gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage on the part of a claimant state or of . . . persons it represents.” This is
supplemented by additional language in the Article which establishes that “no
exoneration shall be granted in cases where the damage has resulted from activities
conducted by a launching State which are not in conformity with international
law.” 116 Because this is a command of the Liability Convention, a claims
commission will have to consider whether such an act or omission happened in
every case.
As a result, there is some leeway for interpretation of the ambiguous
language in Article VI. A claims commission may well interpret that Article to
include the definition of “on the part of” to mean “experienced by,” thereby
exempting launching states from any responsibility for harm which was caused by
an act or omission intended to cause damage to the claimant state. 117 As the
supplementary language above illustrates, however, this exoneration would only
apply if the launching state had not violated international law. 118 Consequently, if
the launching state was the bad actor, it would not enjoy exoneration from liability
under this construction. But if the launching state was an innocent victim of
114
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hijacking, it would not bear the burden of being forced to pay for another actor’s
evil deed.
Akin to this Comment’s first proposed solution, this second solution would
not require amendment to the Liability Convention. This proposed solution
would also have the effect of a blanket exoneration of the launching state from
responsibility for harm which it could not control, similar to the first proposed
solution. As a result, due respect for a state party’s agency in accordance with the
general principles of international law will thereby be ensured. 119 This
interpretation would also maintain consistency with the analogous customary law
of the sea: responsibility for harm under would flow from control instead of
ownership. Thus, the benefits offered by the first two proposed solutions are
effectively identical; they are simply achieved by interpreting different parts of the
Liability Convention’s text. Similarly, the second proposed solution also suffers
from the same flaws as the first. In short, this second solution would similarly
leave a gap in coverage that the Liability Convention was specifically designed to
prevent: an innocent launching state will not be required to pay, but the victims
of harm will not be compensated because there is no mechanism to hold an
intervening actor responsible for harm.
Thus, regardless of whether the true perpetrator is identifiable, adoption of
either this proposed solution or the first proposed solution would mean that harm
would go unaddressed in contravention of the Liability Convention’s explicit
purpose to ensure that prompt payment is made to victims. 120 Moreover, both the
first and second proposed solutions will either be applied arbitrarily or, if adopted
wholesale, will effectively predetermine the launching state as the winner. This will
probably disincentivize victim states from bringing claims at all. Finally, without
the ability of any state involved to bring a claim before an international claims
commission against the true perpetrator, there is a reduced incentive to discover
who the perpetrator is. 121

119
120
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G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 42, at art. 23.
Liability Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble.
It should be noted that this Comment chiefly considers the actions of states. If the perpetrator is a
private person or organization acting to advance private ends, that person or organization is highly
analogous to a pirate. See supra text accompanying note 6. Thus, an international claims commission
is unnecessary; any state may take action against hostis humani generis. If a private actor causes harm
while working on behalf of a state, however, the state effectively controls that actor, and they may
share joint liability. See Alan O. Sykes & Eric A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual
Responsibility under International Law 60–62 (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, Working
Paper No. 279, 2006).
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C. Amend the Liability Convention to Create a Hybrid Regime
As this Comment has explained, there is a contradiction between the
Liability Convention’s terms and background principles of international law. In
addition, there is stark tension within the Liability Convention due to its mutually
exclusive goals of ensuring payment to victims via strict liability and of creating
effective rules for settling disputes between mutually-consenting parties. A
compromise is necessary in order to balance the commands of each of these
opposing influences and to make the liability regime workable.
Under Article XXV of the Liability Convention, the Convention’s terms may
be amended by a majority vote of states party to the Liability Convention. 122
Article XXVI contemplates that the regime may not be perfect in practice and
permits a conference of states party to review the Liability Convention upon a
similar majority vote. 123
Therefore, an amendment to the Liability Convention with the following
broad elements ought to be considered for adoption: First, there may be a
presumption of liability upon the harmful satellite’s launching state, in accordance
with the existing regime. Second, if the satellite’s launching state can point to
evidence illustrating that it is more likely than not that another state actor or a
person whom another state represents is responsible, that evidence will be duly
considered by the claims commission when determining the launching state’s
liability. As part of this consideration, a plan for contribution by the actor at fault
should be mandated, as has been proposed in the analogous context of complex
aircraft crash litigation. 124 In this way, the edge of strict liability and winner
predetermination is dulled, and incentives to bring claims and to identify the bad
actor are created. Because the bad actor may be identified and held legally liable
for the harm he causes, some measure of deterrence is also introduced to the
liability regime. The liability loophole is thus tightened, even if it cannot be
completely closed.
In support of adopting this theory of contribution, joint and several liability
is already contemplated within the current regime when two nations jointly launch
a satellite. 125 Contribution is thus a part of the Liability Convention, albeit only
between states party and in the aforementioned context. The proposed
amendment under consideration would expand contribution to any instance
where a launching state can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is
122
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not responsible for the harm suffered by the claimant state. In other words, the
launching state will be presumed liable and ordered to pay compensation, but if it
can show that another state was more likely than not to be the true culprit, the
launching state can receive a judgment against the bad actor for contribution. 126
In this way, an innocent state will not be unduly burdened with the bill for harm
that it did not cause if it can successfully point to a more culpable actor.
This proposed amendment restores a measure of respect for the principle of
state agency without retooling the entire Liability Convention or nullifying its
terms. The proposed amendment therefore brings the liability regime closer to
consistency with general principles of state responsibility and the law of the sea.
Unlike those bodies of customary international law, though, this proposed
amendment compromises on the principle of holding states responsible only for
what they can control. It does so, however, only to the extent necessary to make
the regime workable. Moreover, whereas the first two solutions proposed by this
Comment would compromise on the principle of guaranteeing compensation by
indemnifying innocent launching states completely, this proposed amendment
would ensure that someone pays for the damage in all cases. Consequently, this
proposed amendment is best poised to accomplish all of the goals of the Liability
Convention while also maintaining more consistency with customary international
law than the current liability regime.

D. Potential Objections and Responses
Each of the above solutions has noteworthy weaknesses. Supporters of the
present liability regime and others may make cogent arguments against the
proposed solutions. These will be considered in turn.
First, one may argue in favor of the present strict liability regime using
principles of law and economics. However, this defense of the Liability
Convention’s current operation is not entirely coherent and does not take the
liability regime’s lack of success into account.
Second, one may argue against the first two solutions offered by this
Comment (jointly termed the interpretive solutions) by arguing that they
substitute one of the Liability Convention’s mutually exclusive goals for another.
Although the interpretive solutions have some benefits, this criticism is a fair one.
Third, a critic may argue against the hybrid regime proposed in Section C by
positing that convincing a majority of states party to amend the Liability
Convention is too daunting a task. While this seems facially plausible, the fact that
compensation will almost certainly not follow under the current regime means
126

The preponderance of the evidence standard is used here because it is typically understood to be
error-minimizing. See James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil
Litigation, 18 TULSA L. REV. 79, 108–09 (1982). However, the accuracy of this view has seen ample
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that an alternative regime with even slightly better odds of compensation could
be popular enough to attract a critical mass of supporters.
Fourth, one may point out that the hybrid regime entails very high
administrative costs and may not be cost-justified. While the full cost involved in
making accurate determinations of fault in these new circumstances is not known,
novel methods of securing contribution may nonetheless make the hybrid regime
cost-effective—or at least an effective deterrent.
Finally, a skeptic may contend that because the act of de-orbiting a satellite
is most likely an act of war, and international instruments like the Liability
Convention are of little utility in war, the whole regime is largely pointless. While
it is true that conduct in war is bounded largely by custom, creating a regime that
at the least may provide marginal deterrence still does something to close the
liability loophole.
In sum, no liability regime is immune to criticism. However, of all the
solutions considered by this Comment, the hybrid regime proposed in Section C
represents the most effective compromise and best ensures that justice will be
done. Therefore, it should be the preferred solution to the Liability Convention’s
current impasse.

1. Strict liability is appropriate because it encourages precaution,
reduces dangerous activity levels, and reduces administrative costs.
One might be tempted to counter the line of argument advanced by this
Comment by positing that a strict liability regime encourages efficient precautions
for satellite owners. However, it is elementary law and economics that strict
liability and negligence regimes both have the same effect in that regard. 127 That
is, strict liability and traditional negligence regimes both encourage optimal care
under ideal conditions. 128 Strict liability regimes are set apart from standard-based
negligence regimes in that they reduce activity levels by imposing liability
regardless of the level of care taken. 129 Therefore, the Liability Convention’s
current reliance on strict liability fails to advance the practical ground of
encouraging efficient precautions any more than an alternative negligence regime
would.
Strict liability regimes operate to reduce the level of abnormally dangerous
activities by forcing participants in such activities to internalize their externalities
regardless of reasonable precautions. 130 Yet, the externality at issue—harm on
127
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See Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J.L.S. 319, 322 (1992).
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Earth—is not being caused in this situation by the satellite owner; it is instead
being brought about by whoever hijacks the satellite. Punishing the satellite owner
for misuse of the satellite may at first seem appropriate in order to incentivize
better security, but the background principles of international law advise against
such a course of action. To analogize, it would be considered absurd and
unprincipled to solely blame the owner of a hijacked ship for the harm caused by
a thief when that thief deliberately rams it into another boat. 131 Similarly, the owner
of a satellite should not be forced to pay for harm caused by its stolen satellite
without an opportunity to be compensated in turn.
Moreover, it is unclear that satellites should remain subject to strict liability.
Satellites are rapidly becoming a common fixture of modern economies, service
anyone with a smartphone or television, and are not highly dangerous to property
on Earth under normal conditions. They are thus not precisely typical subjects for
strict liability. 132 That is, satellites are not abnormally dangerous by their nature—
like explosive blasting is—and they have become a subject of common use. The
strict liability regime thus fails to acknowledge a change in circumstances regarding
the ubiquity and social utility of satellites, which brings the suitability of strict
liability into question.
However, a critic could still argue that strict liability reduces the
administrative costs of the liability regime, thereby streamlining the process and
incentivizing settlement through predictability. Without strict liability, the critic
would argue, there would need to be a lengthy and costly investigation into the
fault of the launching state for the harm caused on Earth. A strict liability regime
is comparatively simple and avoids this.
The problem with this view is that the claims commission is not a binding
court by default, and so the adjudication of claims is dependent on the faith of the
states party in the fairness of that adjudication. Given that states party have been
extremely averse to using the Liability Convention, it would seem that their lack
of faith is disturbing the operation of the current liability regime. That lack of faith
in fairness is probably due to the Liability Convention’s strict liability rule, which
predetermines winners and losers. Not only does the predetermined loser have no
131

132

Indeed, this is precisely the result that the customary law of the sea is poised to avoid. See UNCLOS,
supra note 6, at art. 101–05; see also Oxford Manual, supra note 5, at art. 102.
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problem of perverse incentives considered above.
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practical incentive to consent to the claims commission’s jurisdiction, the Liability
Convention operates in contravention of basic principles of state responsibility,
thereby reducing principled grounds to submit as well. 133 Moreover, any expenses
incurred by the claims commission are “borne equally by the parties, unless
otherwise decided by the Commission,” so the parties themselves have ample
reason to avoid brinksmanship and pursue efficient adjudication. 134 In sum, the
current strict liability regime reduces administration costs, but that benefit is
pointless if a binding adjudication is never made.

2. Reinterpreting the Liability Convention is arbitrary and leaves
victims of harm without compensation.
Because the first two solutions contemplated by this Comment are not
rooted in the intended operation of the Liability Convention, a critic may argue
that both are strained interpretive methods aimed at getting to a desired result. In
other words, because the solutions nullify the clearly-intended strict liability
regime of the Liability Convention, they are arbitrary and illegitimate. A critic
could also rightly argue that maintaining absolute respect for the principle of state
responsibility, without changing the Liability Convention, requires sacrificing the
principle of ensuring compensation for victims of harm.
These points are apt and cannot be easily refuted. As Section A and B
illustrate, there are benefits from accepting either interpretive solution. These
include the lack of necessity for an amendment and bringing the regime into
greater conformity with background principles of international law. However, as
those same Sections explain, implementing either interpretive solution would
nullify the operation of the Liability Convention. In short, the first and second
solutions are not solutions so much as roadblocks for the regime, either of which
would prevent orderly resolution of disputes because an innocent launching state
would always win and no one else is capable of being haled before the
commission. Additionally, without a change in the text and meaning of the
Liability Convention, both solutions could only be used by claims commissions
on a case-by-case basis, without any assurance of consistency across commissions.
This trend will likely culminate in concerns over the arbitrariness of particular
claims commissioners, and since one is chosen by each side in a dispute, the
deciding vote will be cast by the jointly-chosen commissioner, whose views on
this particular subject will become all-important. This would have the expected
result of diminishing general faith in the regime’s fairness and, consequently, its
effectiveness.
133
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Moreover, both interpretive solutions would create a gap in coverage that
the Liability Convention was created in order to address 135—those harmed by a
satellite will go without compensation. If either solution was accepted by a claims
commission under the present liability regime, the victims of harm will have no
ability to gather compensation for their injuries from an international tribunal. The
state representing those victims will consequently be forced to look to diplomacy
to redress their injuries, or, if that fails, war. Either solution would defeat the
purpose of the Liability Convention in the same way that its terms presently do.
In sum, just as the current liability regime fails to ensure justice because of
its arbitrariness, these solutions simply arbitrate in the opposite direction. They do
not solve issues so much as create a different—albeit related—problem. For that
reason, they should not be preferred solutions to the problems considered by this
Comment.

3. The hybrid regime cannot work because amendment is too difficult.
An amendment to create a hybrid regime like the one proposed above is the
most consistent and principled solution of those considered. In spite of this, given
the small number of launching states in the world and the much larger number of
states party to the Liability Convention, it is emphatically in the financial interest
of most states party to keep the current regime (which effectively guarantees them
compensation as a matter of law) at the expense of those nations that perform
most of the launches. This presents a formidable roadblock to an amendment
establishing the hybrid regime.
However, if the amended hybrid liability regime is more likely than the
current regime to result in compensation to victims of harm, then the amendment
would be in the financial interests of all states involved. The amendment could
therefore garner enough support to become effective. Illustrating the failures of
the current liability regime is not difficult. This Comment has explained that under
the current regime, it is eminently unreasonable for launching states to show up
to the bargaining table when they are effectively guaranteed to lose. Because any
decisions made without launching state consent are merely recommendations,
compensation is unlikely to result under the current regime. It is therefore evident
that the current regime is unworkable and is in need of amendment.
Consequently, much hinges on whether the amended Liability Convention
is sufficiently capable of bringing about more compensation for victim states than
the current liability regime. This is difficult to predict without more data about the
Liability Convention’s operation thus far. However, the amended Liability
Convention’s possibility of contribution provides launching states with an
incentive to cooperate with victim states that they currently lack. For that reason,
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the amended hybrid liability regime is at least somewhat more likely to result in
compensation, and so should be capable of being adopted.

4. The hybrid regime cannot work because its administrative costs are
too high.
Determining who is responsible for a cyberattack is often incredibly difficult
and time-consuming. Such attacks may take months to analyze enough to reliably
demonstrate a particular actor’s responsibility. 136 Building a regime that is
dependent on such time-consuming and costly determinations of fault creates a
large sum of administration costs that a strict liability regime avoids. Therefore,
one might posit, the liability regime should concern itself only with a quick and
easy attribution of responsibility and let the other chips fall where they may. In
short, it may be better that a state—even an innocent state—foot the bill
immediately in order to address the harm suffered by another. The paying state
party could then concern itself with identifying the guilty actor if it so chooses and
do with that information what it will.
It is true that even though the amended Liability Convention will be more
consistent with customary international law, its cost-justification is another matter.
Section III of this Comment illustrated that identifying the culprit of a cyberattack
is very difficult, but possible. While the length of time needed to identify the
source of a cyberattack is typically in the range of months, 137 data about the costs
involved in identifying those who commit acts of cyberwarfare is not widely
available. Given the difficulty and length of time involved, it is probable that
accurate determinations are, in fact, highly costly. Because states will be averse to
taking on the substantial burden of investigation without a promise of
compensation for doing so, a formidable obstacle to any definitive identification
of cyberattackers still exists for the amended regime, threatening its workability.
Even so, the liability regime may not be dead in the water. A possible, albeit
highly controversial, solution to this problem echoes age-old practice regarding
pirates. As a matter of custom, pirates are subject to any punishment that a state
apprehending them deems appropriate, including seizure of their assets. 138
Channeling that custom, the victim states may, after identifying the responsible
state, seize assets belonging to that responsible state in order to pay compensation
to the victims of its aggression. The U.N. may also consider assisting the victim
states in identifying the responsible state by paying for the costs of investigation
upfront with a promise of later compensation from the value of the seized assets.
136
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The U.N. Security Council could also authorize the international community to
use force to seize the assets of perpetrator states and turn them over to victim
states in order to ensure that compensation is paid to victim states. 139
While this solution entails the use of force and teeters on the edge of
international armed conflict, it offers a principled intermediary step between the
initial act of aggression and all-out warfare, and for that reason is worthy of
consideration. It should be noted at this juncture that treating a state with the legal
status of a pirate is unheard of. Even so, when states engage in covert acts of
aggression against other states, they are virtually indistinguishable from pirates—
if they are not actually entering into a state of war by performing that act. Thus,
in the interest of maintaining global security through deterrence, the U.N. would
be justified in designating any perpetrator state’s assets subject to seizure up to the
point necessary to pay for compensation. 140 Although such a solution is highly
unorthodox, it is very strongly analogous to the treatment of pirates in customary
international law—just on a larger scale.

5. The Liability Convention itself and all of the proposed solutions are
impractical.
Finally, a skeptic may argue that each of the proposed solutions—and the
liability regime as a whole—are at odds with historical custom regarding
restitution for acts of war during armed conflict between states. 141 In other words,
the Liability Convention could not hope to have any real effect because the most
likely scenario for de-orbiting a satellite involves warfare of some kind and states
customarily compensate their own citizens once peace is re-established. Moreover,
the Cosmos 954 incident illustrates that in the case of an accident, the Liability
Convention is unlikely to be followed when the states involved are unfriendly to
each other, even if they have established diplomatic channels. The only time the
Liability Convention might be workable, the critic would argue, is when the states
involved are already friendly and engaged in regular diplomacy. But then the
Liability Convention would be largely superfluous, as those states would probably
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U.N. Charter art. 39. All states may attack and apprehend pirates and their property, so long as they
do so with vehicles clearly belonging to the government. UNCLOS supra note 6, at arts. 100, 107.
If the perpetrator is an individual, there is an even more direct analogue to pirates, and the
individual’s assets may be similarly seized. U.N. authorization would not be needed to effect the
seizure unless the state in which the individual lives refused to permit it, in which case the state
could be seen as intentionally facilitating piracy by offering pirates its protection, again raising the
question of whether a state can be equivalent to a pirate. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 101.
However, it is unlikely that an individual pirate will possess sufficient assets to fully compensate
victims of the harm they cause. In such a case, the launching state will still foot most of the bill for
the damage.
See Robinson, supra note 79.

214

Vol. 20 No. 1

Closing the Liability Loophole

Kehrer

come to an agreement without needing to invoke international law. Consequently,
the critic would posit, the Liability Convention will not have any strong influence
when it is needed most.
In many respects, these contentions are reasonable. Without a textual
provision waiving applicability in war, the Liability Convention remains in effect
for all damage on Earth caused by space objects in wartime. However, it strains
credulity to believe that the Liability Convention’s terms will be heeded during
armed conflict. 142 Even still, the Liability Convention does not necessarily need to
be perfectly effective in wartime to be worthy of adoption.
An effective liability regime may serve as a deterrent to armed conflict in the
first place by making it costlier for the aggressor if it loses the war. 143 To do so,
the regime may include authorization for the international community to use force
against a bad actor, which would certainly serve as a strong deterrent against using
another state’s satellites to cause harm. A decision by a claims commission that is
adverse to the bad actor could also provide some leverage during peace
negotiations. From just these considerations, it is clear that the Liability
Convention itself is not entirely without utility in wartime, although it will likely
remain a background influence at most. In brief, it could hardly hurt to determine
that the bad actor is legally responsible instead of the innocent satellite owner.

VI. C ONCLUSION
A suggestion to substantially alter a prominent instrument of international
law likely gives the reader pause. However, it must be borne in mind that in spite
of being aimed at dispute resolution, the Liability Convention’s terms currently
create an impractical regime which is in tension with its own professed goals, to
say nothing of its inconsistency with customary international law. For these
reasons, the Liability Convention has seen only very limited use and no notable
success in over four decades of existence. The problems posed by the ongoing
rise of cyberwarfare and exponential increase of human activity in space make
settled routes for dispute resolution essential—but the Liability Convention
cannot serve in that capacity in its current form. Consequently, it rightly deserves
consideration for amendment.
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The hybrid regime amendment proposed by this Comment is a more
consistent and principled solution than the interpretive contortions required by
the first two solutions this Comment proposed. Although in some ancillary
respects it is very novel, it is also intermediary in its central function and does not
dramatically alter the core mechanics of the Liability Convention itself. That is, a
hybrid regime would simply provide an additional process for extracting
compensation from the truly responsible party rather than reforming the liability
regime whole cloth. There are practical problems with the mechanics of actually
getting that contribution, but similar problems of compliance are inherent to
international dispute resolution. At the very least, providing appropriate and
universal rules for obtaining the contribution—whether peacefully or by
authorized seizure—can hardly hurt and will more likely than not deter the
Holmesian bad man from causing harm in the first place. For that reason, the
hybrid regime is the most preferable and palatable option of all those considered.
As this Comment demonstrates, changes to the Liability Convention’s
operation are necessary in order to actualize the motivating principles of
international law and the liability regime’s own stated goals. The solutions
proposed above are not perfect, but they do operate to close—or at least tighten—
the liability loophole. Every liability regime has trade-offs, but a proper regime will
ensure that if harm results on Earth from a space object, it will be compensated
to the extent that justice demands. Just as important as ensuring proper
compensation, however, is the principle that actors who are most responsible for
the damage will similarly be most responsible for compensation, rather than
assigning that duty to innocent launching states. The quest for an ideal legal system
may strike some as naïve, but as man reaches for the stars, so too must the law.
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